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Jennifer Kesteleyn, Shaun Riordan and Huub Ruël define business diplomacy as 
“an approach to geopolitical and non-commercial risk management that is 
based on the practices and mindset of diplomats.”1 In this definition, firms take 
“diplomat-like” actions in seeking to accommodate, avoid and manage exter-
nal risks to the entrepreneurial activity itself. In this sense, the authors make a 
clear distinction between business diplomacy and current definitions of eco-
nomic diplomacy, which can be summarized as actions taken by national gov-
ernments to support and advance the competitive advantage of the firms these 
governments support.2 Even if the definition of business diplomacy is, at times, 
confused with a multitude of concepts like corporate diplomacy, public affairs, 
corporate social responsibility or public relations, Kesteleyn, Riordan and Ruël 
insist that “The key distinction of business diplomacy … is not the actor, but 
the diplomatic mindset, which seeks to place geopolitical risk management 
within a coherent and long-term strategic context.”3
While the conceptual framework and distinctions proposed by experts in 
contemporary diplomacy and international relations do not play a role in dip-
lomatic studies regarding the Early Modern period, the absence of this frame-
work does not necessarily mean that Early Modern historians are oblivious to 
matters concerning business and economic diplomacy as understood for the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. On the contrary, both concepts appear 
prominently in historiography pertaining to the chronology encompassed by 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, albeit concerning specific forms of 
diplomacy, particular firms and very specific geographical spaces.
1 Kesteleyn, J., S. Riordan, and H.J. Ruël. “Introduction: Business Diplomacy.” The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy 9 (2014), 303.
2 Okano-Heijmans, M. “Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of Internation-
al Relations, Economics, ipe and Diplomatic Studies.” In Economic Diplomacy: Economic and 
Political Perspectives, eds. P.A.G. van Bergeijk, M. Okano-Heijmans, and J. Melissen (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 17.
3 Kesteleyn, J., S. Riordan, and H.J. Ruël, “Introduction,” 304.
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The distinction between economic diplomacy and business diplomacy re-
sides in two elements. The first of these elements relates to the actor initiating 
the action of diplomacy. In the case of economic diplomacy that role has been 
reserved for the state, while in the case of business diplomacy it has been de-
ferred to the firm or to agents external to the firm but working on its behalf. 
The second element relates to the diplomatic goals to be attained. While eco-
nomic diplomacy focuses on brokerage between states to negotiate the best 
possible institutional framework for national firms engaged in a specific 
 market, business diplomacy is aimed at managing and preferably reducing cor-
porate risk where firms operate in weak institutional environments or where 
security and access to local institutions are not guaranteed. When translating 
such distinctions (diplomatic actors and diplomatic goals) to the Early Mod-
ern period, certain specific examples come to mind.
Early Modern economic diplomacy, enacted by the state or by institutions 
to whom the state deferred sovereignty, can be best studied through the analy-
sis of diplomatic agreements, treaties and alliances, as much in Europe as in 
Africa, the Americas and Asia. For territories outside Europe, the roles played 
by colonial governors, chartered commercial and joint stock companies, and 
religious orders were paramount in delineating the boundaries of economic 
engagement for all entrepreneurial activities, whether led by firms or through 
other entrepreneurial forms (plantations, refineries, general agricultural ex-
ploitation or mining). In these cases, and contrary to what can be observed in 
the contemporary period, the state played a direct, very succinct and geo-
graphically constrained role in ensuring specific protection for entrepreneurs 
who were subject to its king or republic in a specific market. To a great extent, 
this was a role played by multiple actors, all withholding a specific adjudica-
tion of sovereignty in order to negotiate their entrepreneurial certainties in 
host societies.
The difference between economic diplomacy directly sponsored by the Ear-
ly Modern state and that pursued by the state’s sovereign representatives re-
sulted in differing diplomatic outcomes. Direct intervention, mostly in Europe, 
usually ensured a general institutional regime for all subjects of that particular 
state in a specific host society. Arrangements on tariffs, access to specific mar-
kets and permission to enter specific ports with one’s own fleet or goods cre-
ated a level playing field for all traders and skippers operating in a specific 
market and all subjects of a specific king or republic.4
4 Stapelbroek, K.H., and A. Alimento, The Politics of Commercial Treaties in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury Balance of Power, Balance of Trade (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Walter, R. 
“Economic Relations Between Europe and the World: Dependence and Interdependence.” 
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Economic diplomacy pursued by sovereign representatives of the Early 
Modern state, by contrast, and particularly outside Europe, produced a very 
different type of diplomatic arrangement as many of the treaties between co-
lonial institutions and local polities resulted in regimes of exception through 
the provision of privileges or exclusive access to markets or resources, or secu-
rity to engage with specific markets. In this case, privileges granted to the 
Dutch and English East India Companies or the Society of Jesus were aimed 
mostly at excluding other Europeans from the portrayed local privilege, rather 
than at creating a level playing field for all entrepreneurial initiatives on an 
equal footing.5 This particularity cannot be understood outside the social 
premises characterizing Early Modern societies that were typified not by 
equality for all, but rather by equality for a specific, pre-defined group to the 
exclusion of all others. Early Modern societies were thus populated by regimes 
of multiple exclusion or privilege that existed in parallel within the same soci-
ety and under the same sovereign. This inherently corporatist society not only 
excelled at engaging and enabling economic diplomacy, but it was actually a 
phenomenon that fit well within the societal practices of the time.6
Furthermore, economic diplomacy, initiated by the state or by representa-
tives of its sovereignty, was essential in an Early Modern world where mercan-
tilism in Europe and regimes of economic monopsony, monopoly and  exclusive 
 European History Online (2012), http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-and-the-world/eco-
nomic-relations/rolf-walter-economic-relations-between-europe-and-the-world (accessed 
17 December 2019); Stapelbroek, K.H., ed. Trade and War: The Neutrality of Commerce in the 
Inter-State System (Helsinki: University of Helsinki – Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Stud-
ies 2011); Fisher, H.E.S. The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce, 1700–1770 
(London: Methuen & CO/Barnes and Nobles New York, 1971); Francis, A.D. The Methuens and 
Portugal, 1691–1708 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Scelle, G. La traite ne-
grière aux Indes de Castille. Contracts et traités d’Asiento (Paris: L. Larose & L. Tenin, 1906).
5 Smith, E. “The Global Interest of London’s Commercial Community, 1599–1625: Investment 
in the East India Company.” The Economic History Review 71 (4) (2018), 1118–46; Serrão, J.V., B. 
Direito, E. Rodrigues, and S.M. Miranda, eds. Property Rights, Land and Territory in the Euro-
pean Overseas Empires (Lisbon: cehc-iul 2014); Pettigrew, W.A. Freedom’s Debt: The Royal 
African Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1672–1752 (Chapel Hill: Omo-
hundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Stern, P. The Company-State: 
Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Brockey, L. Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 
1579–1724 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Gaastra, F.S. Bewind en beleid bij 
de voc, 1672–1702 (Zutphen, 1989); Serrão et al., Property Rights.
6 Van Ittersum, M.J. “Global Constitutionalism in the Early Modern Period: The Role of Em-
pires, Treaties and Natural Law.” In Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, eds. A.F. Lang and 
A. Wiener (London: Edgar Elgar Publishing, 2017), 47–59; Pettigrew, W.A. “Corporate Consti-
tutionalism and the Dialogue Between the Global and the Local in Seventeenth-Century 
English History.” Itinerario 39 (3) (2015), 487–507; Mousnier, R. Les institutions de la France 
sous la monarchie absolue 1598–1789 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1974).
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rights co-existed in attempts to define regimes of privileged access to resourc-
es, capital, labor and information. Entrepreneurs or firms not holding deferred 
sovereignty or who were not protected by the results of economic diplomacy 
were left to their own devices in pursuing the three elements of protection, 
advantage and privilege that were essential for managing risk, decreasing pos-
sible transaction costs and increasing the level of predictability in their busi-
ness activities as a whole. This was equally important for firms with only one 
comptoir in a particular city as for firms with several comptoirs and with stakes 
in partnerships across Europe or on other continents.
Business diplomacy was the channel through which the diplomatic agency 
of Early Modern firms and entrepreneurs took place. The three specific mecha-
nisms of practicing business diplomacy at the time, as described below, had in 
common their heavy dependence on personal knowledge of and adaptability 
to the guest society, their accessibility to power brokers in specific sites of 
 government and governance, and their enlarged networks of business con-
tacts willing to provide social and economic support to their entrepreneurial 
endeavors.
The first mechanism of business diplomacy at the disposal of Early Modern 
firms included a diverse panoply of petitions. These were often destined for 
jurisdictional holders who could and did intervene in matters of economic life. 
Kings, municipal councils, noblemen, archbishops, bishops and urban institu-
tions such as guilds and brotherhoods were often approached by specific 
 entrepreneurs, individually or collectively, in an effort to obtain economic pro-
tection, fiscal advantages or exceptional rulings on the use of infrastructures 
(waterways, harbors, bridges, warehouses and the like), on access to specific 
markets, on management or allocation of labor or on imports or exports of 
specific goods and services. Petitions, although professionalized instruments 
used by power brokers (including clerks, lawyers, notaries and scribes) in the 
name of specific firms, were often cheap and thus accessible even to mid- 
ranging entrepreneurs such as shopkeepers, peddlers and transient traders.7
The second instrument of business diplomacy deployed by Early Modern 
firms involved contractualizing specific, usually financial, privileges with the 
7 Van den Tol, J. “Lobbying in Company: Mechanisms of Political Decision-Making and Eco-
nomic Interests in the History of Dutch Brazil, 1621–1656” unpublished PhD dissertation 
(Leiden University, 2018); Fontaine, L. The Moral Economy: Poverty, Credit and Trust in Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Vermeesch, G. “Professional 
Lobbying in Eighteenth-Century Brussels: The Role of Agents in Petitions to the Central Gov-
ernment Institutions in the Habsburg Netherlands.” Journal of Early Modern History 16 (2) 
(2012), 95–119; Van Nierop, H.F.K. “Private Interests, Public Policies: Petitions in the Dutch 
Republic.” In The Public and the Private in Dutch Culture of the Golden Age, eds. A.K. Wheelock 
and A. Seeff (London: Associated University Presses, 2000), 33–39.
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central state. In Western Europe, this contractualization translated into do-
mestic tax farming, personal loans to kings, heavy participation in public debt 
and privileged investments in financial services such as insurance and mort-
gages. While this contractualization was common throughout Europe, local 
entrepreneurs, especially those that were subjects of the king in question, were 
in a privileged position to bid for and attain these contracts. In certain circum-
stances, however, foreign investors, especially those directly or peripherally 
connected with a specific “merchant nation,” were also able to compete on an 
equal footing with local investors. Rather than being automatic, this equality 
was often the result of lengthy negotiations in which matters of war and peace, 
economic advantage and mutuality, and reciprocity of exchanges were codi-
fied. Contrary to the petitions, this specific type of business diplomacy was 
individualistic and generally privileged individual firms and their partners.8
The third and final mechanism of Early Modern business diplomacy, al-
though conducted independently, was often possible only in conjunction with 
one of the other two. Early Modern entrepreneurs were often attracted to the 
exotic products and the wealth that could be extracted from European colonial 
domains. With the exception of the Dutch Republic, the overall policies of 
mercantilism in most European countries, which were heavily regulated 
through monopolies, exclusive and privileged rights, and colonial contracts, 
made it generally very difficult for individual firms to tap into the colonial re-
sources of Western European countries. At the same time, central states faced 
acute challenges in exploiting their own colonial resources since they were of-
ten plagued by inefficient forms of financing, low demographic stocks and a 
general difficulty in asserting authority away from their European territorial 
power bases, while often also being constrained by diplomatic agreements in-
tended to achieve peace in Europe, often disturbing competition overseas. 
These challenges were particularly acute where states lacked cheap local capi-
tal for investment or entrepreneurs willing and able to efficiently exploit the 
overseas resources. These gaps were filled, usually through a system of public 
auction, by non-local entrepreneurs who were contracted under various colo-
nial contracts to enable the extraction of colonial agro-industrial products, the 
management of labor and the extraction of fiscal and financial rents, often on 
behalf of a polity. These contracts personified, on the one hand, the firm’s dip-
lomatic and entrepreneurial capacity to incorporate diplomat-like attributes 
8 Drelichman, M., and H-J. Voth. “Lending to the Borrower From Hell: Debt and Default in the 
Age of Philip ii.” The Economic Journal 121 (2018), 1205–27; Álvarez Nogal, C., and C. Chamley. 
“Debt Policy Under Constraints Between Philip ii, the Cortes and Genoese Bankers.” Eco-
nomic History Review 67 (1) (2014), 192–213; Häberlein, M. The Fuggers of Augsburg: Pursuing 
Wealth and Honor in Renaissance Germany (Philadelphia: University of Virginia Press, 2012).
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to attain social and capital gains, but at the same time, and interchangeably, 
personified the individual transference of the state’s sovereignty to a firm, es-
pecially with regard to the extracting and re-distributing of fiscal rents. In 
those cases, firms not only behaved in a diplomat-like manner, but also be-
came part of the state they served through being the bearers of that state’s 
sovereignty overseas.9
Business diplomacy in the Early Modern world also posed challenges for the 
firm itself. Contrary to contemporary firms, Early Modern businesses were far 
from international organizations able to rely on a well-established and well-
governed bureaucratic body. Instead, Early Modern firms usually had only a 
few partners and one or two clerks, normally all residing in the same city. As far 
as business activities deployed over long distances were concerned, the firm 
relied mostly on a network of agents and representatives, more often than not 
loosely connected to the partners or the firm itself.10 In this context, the firm 
depended on two specific types of business diplomacy: one at the core and one 
at the periphery.
At the core, partners of the firm and, at times, clerks assumed responsibility 
for mediating and lobbying for the firm’s interests with local, regional and na-
tional government bodies. In this negotiating context, the diplomatic agency 
of partners and clerks depended on their capacity to penetrate, integrate or 
assimilate with local networks of power. By petitioning authorities or putting 
themselves in the position of serving the king in any way possible, these indi-
viduals created channels for accessing power and successfully conducting 
business diplomacy. With their success in business diplomacy increasing to-
wards the end of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth 
 century, especially reflected in the growing numbers of firms involved in Atlan-
tic business ventures, partners in these firms accumulated business acu-
men  through official diplomatic representation channels, usually known as 
9 Miranda, S.M. “Risk and Failure in Tax Farming: De Bruijn & Cloots of Lisbon and the 
Portuguese Tobacco Monopoly, 1722–1727.” Itinerario 43 (1) (2019), 122–45; Klooster, W. 
“Slavenvaart op Spaanse kusten: de Nederlandse slavenhandel met Spaanse Amerika, 
1648–1701.” Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 16 (2) (1997), 121–40; Wright, I.A. “The Coymans 
Asiento, 1685–1689.” Bijdragen voor Vaderlandse Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 6 (1924), 
23–62.
10 Gelderblom, O., and F. Trivellato. “The Business History of the Preindustrial World: To-
wards a Comparative Historical Analysis.” Business History 61 (2) (2019), 225–59; Greif, A. 
“The Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational Forms Through History: Reflec-
tions from the Late Medieval Family Firm.” Industrial and Corporate Change 5 (2) (1996), 
473–501; Greif, A. “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society in a Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivism and Individualist Societies.” Journal of Political 
Economy 102 (5) (1994), 912–50.
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 consuls.11 Over time, these consuls, albeit particularly efficient in advancing 
the interests of their own firms, also started developing the diplomatic skills 
and services that culminated, in the nineteenth century, in a broad network of 
consuls being established around the world. But while the diplomatic tasks of 
consuls increased, the core of their function essentially remained business.12 
The entanglement of business and diplomacy lived forth through the nine-
teenth and well into the twentieth century.
Meanwhile at the periphery, agents and business representatives of Euro-
pean firms were forced into diplomat-like exchanges to achieve the goals set by 
the main comptoir in Europe. In geopolitical contexts where European societ-
ies and institutions did not dominate, such as in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, 
agents were forced into broad negotiations in order to gain access to specific 
resources, entrance to particular markets, permission to produce or exchange 
diverse goods and services, or simply the right to operate in a production or 
consumption market. Even though peripheral, these diplomatic business 
agents were of the essence for the firm, especially where the latter’s core busi-
ness depended on long-distance, cross-cultural exchanges. At the same time, 
and although primarily serving the goals and business interests of the firm, 
these power brokers advanced the geopolitical goals and interests of the Euro-
pean states themselves.
These general considerations regarding the Early Modern period demon-
strate that although the concepts of economic and business diplomacy have 
been alien concepts to Early Modern historians, there does exist a broad litera-
ture on these phenomena under the guise of other historiographical concep-
tual parameters. What that literature proves is the existence of economic and 
business diplomatic practices between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries 
that were mutually beneficial for states and firms alike. As an integral part of 
Early Modern societies, economic and business history are bound to become 
11 Reinert, S.A., and R. Fredona. “Merchants and the Origins of Capitalism.” Working Paper 
18–021, Harvard Business School (2017), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/publication%20
files/18-021_b3b67ba8-2fc9-4a9b-8955-670d5f491939.pdf (accessed 17 December 2019); 
Prakash, O. “International Consortiums, Merchant Networks and Portuguese Trade in 
Asia in the Early Modern Period.” Panel Session 37, xiv International Economic History 
Congress, Helsinki, 21–25 August 2006, http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers1/Prakash. 
pdf (accessed 17 December 2019).
12 Smith, E. “Mercantile Diplomacy: Corporations, States and International Negotiation.” In 
Stuart Marriage Diplomacy: Dynastic Politics in their European Context, 1604–1630, eds. 
V. Caldari and S.J. Wolfson (London: Boydell and Brewer, 2018), 125–38; Leira H., and I.B. 
Neumann. “Judges, Merchants and Envoys: The Growth and Development of the Consular 
Institution.” Panel Session FB44, 47th Annual isa Convention, San Diego, 2006, https://
www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/371402476.pdf (accessed 17 December 2019).
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part of what John Watkins has coined “a new diplomatic history of Medieval 
and Early Modern Europe.”13
13 Watkins, J. “Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe.” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 38 (1) (2008), 1–14.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/07/2021 11:27:12AM
via free access
